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UNIVERSAL REPRESENTATION
Lindsay Nash*
In an era in which there is little good news for immigrant communities and
even holding the line has become an ambitious goal, one progressive project
has continued to gain steam: the movement to provide universal
representation for noncitizens in removal proceedings. This effort, initially
born out of a pilot project in New York City, has generated a host of
replication projects throughout the nation and holds the promise of even
broader expansion. But as it grows, this effort must confront challenges from
within: the sort-of supporters who want to limit this representation system’s
coverage in a number of ways, some of which may not merely change the
scope of the program, but the core of the project itself.
The term “universal representation”—long used in the criminal justice
system—is relatively new to the field of deportation defense. At its purest,
it refers to a system in which individuals facing prosecution by government
adversaries are entitled to appointed counsel if they cannot afford to retain
their own.1 Universal representation’s claim to uniqueness derives from the
fact that, unlike other models of pro bono representation for indigent litigants,
access to counsel does not depend on the apparent merits of the individual’s
claim. The universal representation model—at least in the immigration
arena—was first fleshed out in a study launched by Chief Judge Robert A.
Katzmann of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.2
* Clinical Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. My appreciation
for those working as part of the Study Group on Immigrant Representation, the New York
Immigrant Representation Study, and the New York Immigrant Family Unity Project for
pioneering the movement for universal representation in the immigration arena, and to Chief
Judge Robert A. Katzmann, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for launching this
movement. Thanks to Annie Chen, Avideh Moussavian, Andrea Saenz, and Emily Tucker for
the thoughtful panel discussion that inspired this piece, to Peter Markowitz, Annie Chen,
Victoria Muirhead, Robert Gonzalez, and the participants in the Clinical Law Review
Workshop for their time and feedback, and to Jessica Kulig for excellent research assistance.
1. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides immigrants in removal proceedings the
right to retain counsel of their choosing at their own expense, but it does not provide a right to
appointed counsel if they cannot afford to hire an attorney, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012), and,
generally speaking, no constitutional right to an attorney has been recognized in this context.
2. This study yielded two reports, which served as the impetus and proposal for the
creation of the New York Immigrant Family Unity Project, New York City’s system of
appointed counsel for indigent noncitizens who are detained and facing removal. See generally
Steering Comm. of the N.Y. Immigrant Representation Study Report, Accessing Justice: The
Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357
(2011) [hereinafter Accessing Justice I]; N.Y. IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION STUDY STEERING
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The study recognized that longstanding models for providing immigration
legal services had generally allocated pro bono resources to cases that
immediately present a strong chance of success.3 However, it argued for
adopting a universal representation system based on the recognition that
(1) meritorious claims are often not obvious at the outset of a case, and
(2) regardless of the strength of the claim, it is fundamentally unfair to force
noncitizens to face the devastating prospect of deportation without the
assistance of counsel.4 This study offered a blueprint for such a system—
one that provides representation regardless of the apparent merits of the case
and thereby improves the quality of justice in immigration courts and the
integrity of the removal system as a whole. The publication of this study
catalyzed a movement to implement that plan, which materialized as the New
York Immigrant Family Unity Project and other efforts nationwide.5
The universal representation model has fundamentally changed the nature
of proceedings in immigration courts where it has been implemented. This
is true not only for individuals facing deportation—who, with counsel, are
1100 percent more likely to obtain a successful outcome—but also for
immigration judges and agency prosecutors.6 However, as an increasing
number of municipalities and counties create such systems,7 they must
consider local concerns and practicalities—issues that vary widely given the
differences in location of detention facilities, courts, resources, and political

COMM., ACCESSING JUSTICE II: A MODEL FOR PROVIDING COUNSEL TO NEW YORK
IMMIGRANTS IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS (2012) [hereinafter ACCESSING JUSTICE II].
3. ACCESSING JUSTICE II, supra note 2, at 19–20.
4. Id.
5. See infra Part I.B.
6. JENNIFER STAVE ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, EVALUATION OF THE NEW YORK
IMMIGRANT FAMILY UNITY PROJECT: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION ON
FAMILY AND COMMUNITY UNITY 34–35 (2017), https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-webassets/downloads/Publications/new-york-immigrant-family-unity-project-evaluation/legacy
_downloads/new-york-immigrant-family-unity-project-evaluation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
S6EY-7N8R] (reporting that immigration judges and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement’s deputy chief counsel have recognized the benefits for immigration court
proceedings, including improved communication and increased efficiency, following
implementation of the universal representation program at the New York City detained
immigration court).
7. See, e.g., STEPHEN W. MANNING ET AL., DEFEND EVERYONE: CREATING THE EQUITY
CORPS OF OREGON TO PROVIDE UNIVERSAL REPRESENTATION 4 (2018),
https://innovationlawlab.org/reports/Defend_Everyone_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LG4EAPZ] (proposing a system with a centralized clearinghouse and dedicated lawyers that lay
the groundwork for nascent programs in Portland and Multnomah County, Oregon); NAT’L
IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., BLAZING A TRAIL: THE FIGHT FOR RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN DETENTION
AND BEYOND 18–19, 22 (2016), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Right-toCounsel-Blazing-a-Trail-2016-03.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5JK9-8JUT]
(describing
representation initiatives, including in New Jersey and California); SAFE Cities Network,
VERA INST. JUST., https://www.vera.org/vera-maps/safe-cities-network [https://perma.cc/
HJG4-6BZJ] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (describing the creation of similar programs in Atlanta,
Georgia; Austin, Texas; Baltimore, Maryland; Chicago, Illinois; Columbus, Ohio; Denver,
Colorado; Oakland and Alameda County, California; Prince George’s County, Maryland;
Sacramento, California; Santa Ana, California; and San Antonio, Texas).
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constituencies—and make decisions about the scope of the system’s
coverage.8
For a system based on the idea that everyone facing deportation should
have meaningful access to legal representation, decisions about why and how
to limit the scope of the coverage among indigent litigants are difficult,
though often necessary given resource constraints. While these choices have
given rise to several types of coverage limitations, the most controversial
limitation is a newly created condition for eligibility in some jurisdictions:
the absence of certain criminal convictions.9 Localities seeking to impose
such a restriction have done so largely based on their views that individuals
with convictions deemed “serious” are undesirable to both taxpayers and
municipal officials, and do not merit the privilege of the procedural
protections that government-funded counsel affords.10
This Essay seeks to provide current and historical context for the universal
representation model and ultimately argues that, while some limits on the
scope of the coverage may be justifiable, restrictions like the convictionbased eligibility carveout threaten the most basic underpinnings of the
universal representation project. Many scholars and advocates have
developed arguments for recognizing a right to counsel on constitutional
grounds11 or creating one for policy reasons.12 This Essay, however,
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See, e.g., Gloria Pazmino, de Blasio Defends Policy to Exclude Some Immigrants from
Receiving Free Legal Help, POLITICO (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.politico.com/states/
new-york/city-hall/story/2017/12/29/de-blasio-defends-policy-to-exclude-some-immigrantsfrom-receiving-free-legal-help-164372 [https://perma.cc/LHP6-6YTJ]; Liz Robbins, All
Immigrants Should Be Given Lawyers, Some City Council Members Say, N.Y. TIMES (May
31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/nyregion/immigrant-legal-services-newyork.html [https://perma.cc/6JST-PBSZ]; infra notes 116–17 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Pazmino, supra note 9; Robbins, supra note 9.
11. See, e.g., Matt Adams, Advancing the “Right” to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 9
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 169, 180 (2010) (arguing that due process requires the appointment
of counsel and that existing precedent strengthens that argument for at least some cases);
Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent Residents, 122 YALE L.J.
2394, 2403–06 (2013) (arguing that the traditional due process requires appointed counsel for
lawful permanent residents); Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 1299 (2011) (arguing that, in light of a 2010 Supreme Court Sixth Amendment precedent,
courts should recognize a right to criminal law protections, such as the appointment of counsel,
in at least some cases); John R. Mills et al., “Death Is Different” and a Refugee’s Right to
Counsel, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 361 (2009); Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal
Representation for Detained Aliens: Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 CONN. L. REV.
1647 (1997) (arguing that due process requires assigned counsel for detainees in immigration
proceedings); see also Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon’s Migration, 122 YALE L.J. 2282, 2305–14
(2013) (drawing on the lessons from the implementation of the criminal public defender
system to introduce a framework for evaluating alternative approaches for structuring an
“immigration Gideon system” to provide removal defense to indigent noncitizens). Vivek
Mittal, a scholar and advocate who worked on the creation of Los Angeles’s universal
representation system, did some of the earliest work applying these legal and policy-based
arguments to the universal representation context in a case study of the system in Los Angeles.
This Essay draws on his unpublished manuscript, “Carving Out Immigrants: Is California
Pro-Immigrant?”
12. See, e.g., THE CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: ENSURING
COUNSEL FOR IMMIGRANTS FACING DEPORTATION IN THE D.C. METROPOLITAN AREA (2017),
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uniquely focuses on the question of how, absent a court-recognized right,
entitlements to representation by counsel have historically been allocated and
how that allocation should inform choices about the provision of counsel
today. Considering the history of how Americans have understood the role
of and right to counsel, which is reflected in express commitments by states
and the federal government since the founding, allows us to understand the
values underlying a universal representation system and provides important
context for the definitional questions proponents of such a system in
immigration proceedings now confront.
Part I seeks to explain the innovation of universal representation in the
immigration arena, comparing this model for providing removal defense
services with other, long-enduring models for pro bono immigrant
representation. It explains why universal representation is not merely a
change in the scope of representational resources, but a change in kind, and
how such a program benefits the immigration adjudication system on a
structural level. It then describes some of the definitional questions that have
arisen as this model proliferates. To answer this question, Part II explores
the origins of universal representation—which are in the criminal defense
system—to understand the choices made in early America when the
assistance of counsel was not a right and the decision to provide counsel was
governed instead by notions of fairness and justice. Part III considers how
this history should inform our understanding of universal representation and
guide us in future policymaking and focuses in particular on nascent efforts
to limit the scope of coverage or eligibility in universal representation
programs. Ultimately, this Essay makes the case that, while some limitations
on eligibility for publicly funded representation may not conflict with the
project’s fundamental goals, restrictions such as the one for individuals with
certain criminal convictions threaten the core concepts underlying the
universal representation model. At minimum, that type of restriction stakes
out an unprecedented position in our nation’s history of universal
representation. Far worse, it portends a denial of access to procedural
protections for those facing one of the harshest exercises of state power—
which is among the most significant harms that universal representation is
intended to prevent.
I. DEFINING UNIVERSAL REPRESENTATION
A world of limited resources often means tough decisions about allocation.
In a system where not having a lawyer increases the likelihood of loss,13 and
https://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/DC_Access_to_Counsel_rev4_033117%20
%281%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8Y2-SLGF] (making policy arguments for creating a
universal representation system in the D.C. area); NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., supra note
7, at 8–12; ACCESSING JUSTICE II, supra note 2, at 12–17. See also Vivek Mittal’s unpublished
manuscript, which is discussed supra note 11.
13. STAVE ET AL., supra note 6, at 5–6 (estimating a 1100 percent increase from the
observed 4 percent success rate for unrepresented cases at the detained court before the
implementation of the court’s universal representation program); see also ACCESSING JUSTICE
II, supra note 2, at 1 (“While, at one end, nondetained immigrants with lawyers have
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a loss means deportation, the stakes of deciding how to allocate lawyers are
among the highest in American legal practice.14 This Part describes how
organizations have historically made these choices, the innovative alternative
offered by the universal representation model, and the definitional questions
that have arisen as localities seek to put the universal representation model
into practice.
A. Merits-Based Selection
In the immigration arena, where there is no general recognized
constitutional or statutory right to counsel,15 the role of providing legal
counsel to indigent noncitizens is filled by nonprofit providers and pro bono
attorneys. The need always exceeds existing resources.16 This has long been
true on a national level, where now almost 40 percent of individuals in
removal proceedings lack counsel17 (a number that has historically been even
lower18) and even in urban areas that are comparatively richer in nonprofit
and pro bono resources.19 As such, nonprofit legal-service providers have
long had to make difficult choices about how to allocate their limited
representational resources.20 This necessarily requires considerations of
capacity, impact on the population served, and, of course, future funding.
successful outcomes 74 percent of the time, those on the other end, without counsel and who
were detained, prevailed a mere 3 percent of the time.” (emphasis omitted)).
14. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) (“[D]eportation may result in the loss
‘of all that makes life worth living.’” (quoting Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284
(1922)); see also Baltazar-Alcazar v. INS, 386 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[I]mmigration
laws have been termed second only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity. A lawyer is
often the only person who could thread the labyrinth.” (quoting Castro-O’Ryan v. U.S. Dep’t
of Immigration & Naturalization, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1987))).
15. Accessing Justice I, supra note 2, at 359. While there is no recognized general right
to counsel, a few courts have recognized rights in specific circumstances, particularly where
the litigant has a serious mental disorder that prevents her from representing herself. See, e.g.,
Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1056–58 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (recognizing
that the provision of pro bono counsel is a reasonable accommodation required by the
Rehabilitation Act for certain litigants with serious mental disabilities).
16. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2016 STATISTICS
YEARBOOK
F1
(2017),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/fysb16/download
[https://perma.cc/39P6-5QKR] (reporting the number of unrepresented individuals annually
nationwide); Accessing Justice I, supra note 2, at 379 (reporting the breakdown of sectors
providing legal representation to individuals who could not afford to hire private counsel).
17. Accessing Justice I, supra note 2, at 379.
18. Id.
19. See CAL. COAL. FOR UNIVERSAL REPRESENTATION, CALIFORNIA’S DUE PROCESS
CRISIS:
ACCESS TO LEGAL COUNSEL FOR DETAINED IMMIGRANTS 7 (2016),
https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/access-to-counsel-Calif-coalition-report2016-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6HB-4XQD] (showing that, in both Los Angeles and San
Francisco, more than two-thirds of detained noncitizens and more than a quarter of
nondetained noncitizens facing removal lacked counsel); Accessing Justice I, supra note 2, at
381–82 (showing that, before the implementation of the New York Immigrant Family Unity
Project, more than two-thirds of detained individuals in New York City lacked counsel and
more than 20 percent of nondetained individuals facing removal lacked counsel).
20. Notably, in leading the effort to expand access to competent counsel, Judge Katzmann
has persuasively reframed the inquiry as a matter of first identifying what is necessary to
ensure fairness and justice and, second, determining how to amass the resources necessary to
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Organizational mission is often a critical first screening criterion for
immigrant representation providers. What this means as a matter of practice
is that providers choose or decline cases, as an initial matter, based on some
consideration of the type of case, generally the substance of the claim that
the person is raising and the type of protection or relief from deportation that
the person is seeking.21 For example, Immigration Equality is an
organization whose mission is to advocate for “lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, queer (LGBTQ), and HIV-positive immigrants seeking safety,
fair treatment, and freedom.”22 Similarly, Human Rights First—an
organization dedicated to protecting refugees, defending persecuted
minorities, and combatting torture23—focuses on cases of individuals
seeking protection from persecution or torture in their home countries.24
Central American Legal Assistance, as the name suggests, focuses on cases
of individuals from a specific geographic area.25 Other organizations have a
more generalist orientation and accept a range of case types, but focus
resources on a certain category of individuals, such as those with some
connection to the organization. For example, community-based membership
organizations often prioritize the cases of their members and members’
families in deciding who to represent, explaining that this is an important
service that is offered to their large constituency of members.26 And still
other types of organizations will consider a range of case types, but focus
representation on individuals who live within a specific catchment area27 or

make that a reality. See Robert A. Katzmann, Innovative Approaches to Immigrant
Representation: Exploring New Partnerships, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 339 (2011) (“The
fundamental questions before us are how best to achieve the fair and effective administration
of justice for immigrants, and what kinds and level of resources are needed to achieve that
end.”).
21. See Eagly, supra note 11, at 2290–91 (explaining that “most organizations specialize
in select areas of immigration law, such as family-based petitions or asylum” and noting that,
in some instances, funding restrictions explicitly prevent providers from taking certain types
of cases).
22. About Us, IMMIGR. EQUALITY, https://www.immigrationequality.org/about-us/
[https://perma.cc/CRU3-Z84Q] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); Get Legal Help, IMMIGR.
EQUALITY, https://www.immigrationequality.org/get-legal-help/ [https://perma.cc/4BZVNRGU] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
23. About
Us,
HUM.
RTS.
FIRST,
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/about
[https://perma.cc/C54P-YUBQ] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
24. Asylum Seekers:
How to Become a Client, HUM. RTS. FIRST,
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/asylum-seekers-and-potential-clients
[https://perma.cc/TLJ6-9RGG] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
25. CENT.
AM.
LEGAL
ASSISTANCE,
https://www.centralamericanlegal.info/
[https://perma.cc/C5RR-LW7B] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
26. See, e.g., Litigation and Legal Representation, ADELANTE ALA. WORKERS CTR.,
http://adelantealabama.org/program-areas/legal/ [https://perma.cc/TUK9-X6L6] (last visited
Oct. 4, 2018) (“Most of Adelante’s legal resources are dedicated to representing our members
and pursuing litigation and legal advocacy that advances our mission and the interests of our
members.”).
27. See, e.g., Immigration Defense, NDS HARLEM, http://www.ndsny.org/index.php/
practice-areas-2/immigration-defense/ [https://perma.cc/FK88-9GVV] (last visited Oct. 4,
2018).
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who are detained at particular detention centers.28 A range of other factors
further affect the decision to constrain intake to particular types of cases, but
common considerations include preexisting in-house experience in a
particular area and the amount of resources required to litigate cases.29
While these initial criteria differ across organizations, a second step of
virtually all intake decisions is consideration of the apparent merits of the
potential case.30
This is a significant—at times determinative—
consideration that is necessary because, given the extent of the need and the
limitations of representation resources, providers must consider which of the
cases within their broader mission should be selected for representation.31 In
the immigration context, representation typically means a significant
commitment of organizational resources, as it means entering into a
relationship that could last for years and require hundreds of hours of work.32
Unsurprisingly, many resource-strapped organizations are reluctant to devote

28. See,
e.g.,
Detention,
RAICES,
https://www.raicestexas.org/detention/
[https://perma.cc/6A8W-UM7H] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (explaining that RAICES provides
free immigration representation to people detained by ICE in Pearsall, Texas); Our Work,
PANGEA LEGAL SERVICES, http://www.pangealegal.org/services/ [https://perma.cc/XNA37A7K] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (noting its focus on detained pro bono representation in some
San Francisco Immigration Court facilities: West County Detention Center in Richmond,
Yuba County Jail in Marysville, Mesa Verde Detention Facility in Bakersfield, and Rio
Cosumnes Correctional Center in Elk Grove).
29. Accessing Justice I, supra note 2, at 395, 401 (reporting the lack of expertise in a
particular area of removal defense and lack of sufficient resources to litigate time-intensive
cases as factors that nonprofits consider in declining cases).
30. See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: An Agenda for Legal Education and
Research, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 531, 542 (2013) (noting “some [pro bono] practitioners’
preferences for selecting cases that appear ‘most meritorious,’” which is made “uncomfortably
visible” in studies that eliminate that selection mechanism); Accessing Justice I, supra note 2,
at 386 (noting that litigants with colorable claims for relief are more likely to be represented
based on the view that “focusing on obviously viable claims for relief allows nonprofit
organizations and pro bono attorneys to maximize their limited representational resources”);
see also, e.g., Robert A. Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the
Immigrant Poor, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3, 15 (2007) (describing an immigrant
representation project that receives referrals where it appears to the immigration judge at the
outset that the pro se litigant facing removal has “plausible claims of relief”); BD. OF
IMMIGRATION APPEALS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE BIA PRO BONO PROJECT IS SUCCESSFUL i
(2004),
https://cliniclegal.org/sites/default/files/BIAProBonoProjectEvaluation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SB4Z-3VQK] (“Given its limited resources and current case screening
design, the project selects the most meritorious cases on appeal before the Board.”).
31. Accessing Justice I, supra note 2, at 386 (explaining that indigent litigants with
obviously viable claims for relief tend to show higher rates of representation because
“focusing on obviously viable claims for relief allows nonprofit organizations and pro bono
attorneys to maximize their limited representational resources”); id. at 401 (reporting results
of a survey of removal-defense providers, which showed that “lack of relief or waiver options”
was one reason for declining to represent individuals).
32. In a survey conducted in 2010, “[a] majority of [removal-defense providers] indicated
they averaged less than 100 hours on a nondetained case, and between 100 to 200 hours on
more complex cases involving filing for multiple forms of relief, habeas petitions, and raising
collateral challenges to convictions in criminal court (which may arise where convictions have
adverse immigration consequences).” Id. at 400 (reporting the time expended in 2008, the
most recent year for which full data was available).

510

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

limited staff time and organizational funding to cases that, at the intake phase,
appear unlikely to succeed.33
B. Universal Representation
The universal representation model offers a distinct alternative to the
traditional model of merits-focused case selection in immigrant
representation. This model was born from the New York Immigrant
Representation Study, a two-part study that was an initiative of the Study
Group on Immigrant Representation launched by Judge Robert A. Katzmann,
currently Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.34
This study was intended to assess the availability of quality representation
for noncitizens facing removal in the New York area and propose solutions
to the apparent “immigrant representation crisis” that actors had observed.35
The first New York Immigrant Representation Study Report documented the
need for representation for those facing removal in the New York City area
and the impact of counsel and detention on the outcome of individuals’
removal cases.36 Specifically, it analyzed data from multiple federal
agencies and found that nondetained immigrants represented by lawyers had
successful case outcomes 74 percent of the time, whereas those not
represented by counsel and detained prevailed only 3 percent of the time.37
The findings of the study suggested that many detained litigants facing
removal had valid bases to lawfully remain in the United States but were
deported because they lacked representation.38 In other words, it indicated
that indigent noncitizens with valid claims were not being identified or served
in a merits-focused intake system where providers were under severe
financial constraints.
33. See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 48 (2015) (explaining that attorneys offering free
legal services may strategically select cases with the strongest or most sympathetic claims);
Accessing Justice I, supra note 2, at 386, 395, 401 (explaining that resource constraints limited
the types of cases removal-defense providers could take on and how nonprofits often seek to
maximize those resources).
34. ACCESSING JUSTICE II, supra note 2, preface (“The Study Group seeks to facilitate
adequate counsel for immigrants in the service of the fair and effective administration of
justice. [It] is drawn principally from law firms, nonprofit organizations, immigration groups,
bar associations, law schools, and federal, state, and local governments. Through reports, pilot
projects, colloquia, and meetings, the Study Group has focused on increasing pro bono
activity, improving mechanisms of legal service delivery, and rooting out inadequate
counsel.”).
35. Katzmann, supra note 30, at 4 (emphasizing the importance of quality representation
for immigrants, “not only because the stakes are often so high—whether individuals will be
able to stay in this country or reunite their families or be employed—but also because there is
a wide disparity in the success rate of those who have lawyers and those who proceed pro se”);
Robert A. Katzmann, When Legal Representation Is Deficient: The Challenge of Immigration
Cases for the Courts, 143 DAEDALUS 37, 44 (2014).
36. See Accessing Justice I, supra note 2, at 358–60.
37. Id. at 383.
38. See id. at 387; ACCESSING JUSTICE II, supra note 2, at 19 (“Representation models that
rely on merits-based screenings to limit services inevitably fail to uncover meritorious claims
to relief.”).
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The second New York Immigrant Representation Study Report built upon
the prior report’s findings on the importance of augmenting legal services for
this population and proposed a new model for the provision of
representation.39 Drawing on the assigned counsel system in the criminal
justice system, it proposed a merits-blind intake mechanism in which
indigent individuals would be entitled to representation regardless of the
apparent strength of their claims.40 This second report explained that meritsblind universal representation would be critical for two key reasons. First, a
lawyer, who represents access to procedural protections, is an essential
component of a just system.41 Second, it would be impossible to accurately
assess relief eligibility without doing the factual and legal investigation that
could not be accomplished at the intake phase due to the “extraordinary
complexity” of modern immigration law, the need to obtain facts that may be
unknown to the client, detainees’ restricted access to relevant records and
information, and the need to build trust before clients would provide highly
sensitive information necessary for some types of relief from removal.42 The
study explained that “[r]epresentation models that rely on merits-based
screenings to limit services inevitably fail to uncover meritorious claims to
relief” and that, given the “life-altering” stakes of abandoning a defense to
deportation, no individual should make that decision “with[out] the advice
and counsel of an attorney who has enough information to accurately advise
his or her client of the probability of a successful defense and the
consequences of abandoning it.”43
Thus, in recognizing that the first universal representation system would
still exist in a world of limited resources, the report laid the groundwork for
a new understanding of efficiency in the immigrant representation context.
Instead of focusing resources on the cases that immediately present the
strongest chance of success and could perhaps succeed without counsel (as
in merits-based selection), the universal representation model suggests that
by providing counsel to cases that otherwise stood virtually no chance of
success, the impact of legal representation would be greater. As such, the
program described in the second report focused on individuals who were
most vulnerable to loss in their cases absent the assistance of counsel which,
based on the findings in the first report, meant those who were detained.44
39. Id.
40. Id. Importantly, the study recognized that such representation must be meaningful,
and therefore should include not just lawyers, but access to social workers, investigators, and
other professionals necessary to provide a minimum quality level of representation. Id. at 22–
23; see also Sabrina Ardalan, Access to Justice for Asylum Seekers: Developing an Effective
Model of Holistic Asylum Representation, 48 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1001, 1031–38 (2015).
41. ACCESSING JUSTICE II, supra note 2, at 19–20.
42. Id. at 19 (explaining that such information is necessary for assessing eligibility for
persecution-based relief or special remedies for victims of domestic violence, trafficking, or
other crimes); see also Accessing Justice I, supra note 2, at 387 (“Many cases present
circumstances where forms of potential relief are less obvious or might require complicated
litigation . . . .”).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 15, 17.
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One important benefit of implementing a universal representation system,
as the report makes clear, is its impact on the immigration system as a whole.
The system proposed did not merely assign lawyers to cases but described
the minimum components necessary for meaningful representation in this
context and laid out a baseline for the profession.45 This was particularly
important given the New York Immigrant Representation Study’s findings
about the poor quality of counsel in a system often viewed as merely an
administrative processing system.46 And, by ensuring a cadre of zealous
defenders for litigants facing government attorneys and bringing welllitigated immigration cases to the Courts of Appeals for review, universal
representation begins to formalize, judicialize, and demand integrity from the
adjudication system.47
Arguments about the impact of counsel for noncitizens and the social and
economic benefits of such a system proved persuasive, and so began the first
universal immigration representation system. Implementation began with a
small pilot project in 2013—the New York Immigrant Family Unity Project
(NYIFUP)48—and the project has continued to grow.49 The pilot was
implemented when the New York City Council provided $500,000 in
funding, which permitted the contract legal-service providers to represent
190 of the 900 indigent detained immigrants whose cases were before the
Varick Street court.50 Importantly, the 190 litigants were selected based on
their inability to hire counsel—and not the apparent merits of their case—
which provided the first practical information on how the universal
45. See supra note 40.
46. See Accessing Justice I, supra note 2, at 388–93.
47. See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1757–
58, 1766 (1993) (arguing that in the criminal context, given the state’s relative power, zealous
advocacy should be presumed and that therefore defenders should, as a general rule, presume
zealous advocacy is proper on their side as well). See generally Elizabeth Keyes, Zealous
Advocacy: Pushing Against the Borders in Immigration Litigation, 45 SETON HALL L. REV.
475 (2015) (applying Luban’s analysis in arguing that zealous advocacy should be a default
for immigration attorneys and examining the way that holding immigration attorneys to this
standard is likely to be significant in professionalizing the bar).
48. This first-in-the-nation universal representation program was launched by the Vera
Institute of Justice, the Northern Manhattan Coalition for Immigrant Rights, the Center for
Popular Democracy, Make the Road New York, and the Kathryn O. Greenberg Immigration
Justice Clinic at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, and supported by a coalition of
organizations in the New York City area. STAVE ET AL., supra note 6, at 10–12. Legal services
are provided by local nonprofit organizations Brooklyn Defender Services, Bronx Defenders,
and the Legal Aid Society of New York which were selected through a competitive bidding
process. Id. at 11.
49. Id. at 10 (describing the expansion of NYIFUP from the original 190 cases accepted
for representation between November 2013 and April 2014 to the representation of almost all
other unrepresented detained immigrants who met the eligibility requirements between July
2014 and June 2016). See generally NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., supra note 7 (describing
growth of the NYIFUP model within and beyond New York State).
50. STAVE ET AL., supra note 6, at 10; New York City Becomes First Jurisdiction in Nation
to Provide Universal Representation to Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation, VERA INST.
JUST. (June 26, 2014), https://www.vera.org/newsroom/press-releases/new-york-citybecomes-first-jurisdiction-in-nation-to-provide-universal-representation-to-detainedimmigrants-facing-deportation [https://perma.cc/XSQ6-BWS6].
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representation model would work in practice.51 The pilot project proved
successful, and the following year, the New York City Council increased the
funding sufficient to allow NYIFUP to provide coverage to all eligible
immigrants with cases before the New York Immigration Court.52 The
success of this project in New York City generated support for a similar pilot
program in upstate New York53 and, through the collective work of
community organizations, legal service providers, other advocates, and the
Vera Institute for Social Justice, is now fully funded as a statewide
initiative.54
In addition to the system that now covers all of New York, similar systems
of varying coverage and sizes have been or are being launched in at least
fifteen municipalities and counties in nine other states—a national expansion
galvanized by immigrant communities and advocates.55 The replication of
51. See STAVE ET AL., supra note 6, at 10.
52. Id.
53. The New York State Assembly allocated funding for a five-month pilot program at
the Buffalo Federal Detention Center in Batavia, New York, which began in November 2014.
Press Release, Vera Inst. of Justice, Public Defender Program for Detained Immigrants
Expands to Western New York (Nov. 10, 2014), https://www.vera.org/newsroom/pressreleases/public-defender-program-for-detained-immigrants-expands-to-western-new-york
[https://perma.cc/3Z4Q-7HX3]. This upstate NYIFUP program continued to be renewed and
was expanded to cover New York’s other detained court, in Ulster County, before ultimately
covering the entire state. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., supra note 7, at 18; Grace Paras
& Marina Caeiro, Gaining Momentum: The New York Immigrant Family Unity Project
Expands to the Ulster Immigration Court, VERA INST. JUST.: THINKJUSTICE BLOG (Dec. 7,
2015),
https://www.vera.org/blog/rss-feed-gaining-momentum-the-new-york-immigrantfamily-unity-project-expands-to-the-ulster-immigration-court
[https://perma.cc/V3Z3WDZD].
54. See Crimesider Staff, New York State to Offer Free Legal Help to More Immigrants
Facing
Deportation,
CBS
NEWS
(Apr.
7.
2011,
3:23
PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/new-york-state-to-offer-free-legal-help-to-moreimmigrants-facing-deportation/ [https://perma.cc/9UJT-SQ2H] (reporting that a $4 million
infusion from New York State would make New York the first state in the country to provide
attorneys for all financially eligible immigrants facing deportation); Kelly Knaub, NY 1st State
to Get Attys for Immigrants Facing Deportation, LAW360 (Apr. 11, 2017, 5:11 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/911206/ny-1st-state-to-get-attys-for-immigrants-facingdeportation [https://perma.cc/5ZF3-YYGB]; New York State Becomes First in the Nation to
Provide Lawyers for All Immigrants Detained and Facing Deportation, VERA INST. JUST.
(Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.vera.org/newsroom/press-releases/new-york-state-becomes-firstin-the-nation-to-provide-lawyers-for-all-immigrants-detained-and-facing-deportation
[https://perma.cc/YH98-CPZM].
55. While Part III discusses other municipalities’ expansion efforts in greater detail, it is
important to recognize the recent innovation of nonprofit-led universal representation–style
systems at specific detention centers in recent years. Perhaps the most systematic of these is
the CARA Family Detention Pro Bono Project, based in Dilley, Texas, which began to take
shape in 2015 and provides universal representation to all mothers and children who are
detained at the family detention center in Dilley and who, for the most part, are in various
stages of credible-fear proceedings. See CARA Family Detention Project, AM. IMMIGR. LAW.
ASS’N (June 21, 2018), https://www.aila.org/practice/pro-bono/find-your-opportunity/carafamily-detention-pro-bono-project [https://perma.cc/A4NL-MYCK]. This program is funded
by a consortium of nonprofits and donations, operates in significant part through the work of
volunteers, and is part of a broader effort to do this type of work at Artesia, New Mexico;
Karnes, Texas; and in the Deep South through the Southern Poverty Law Center’s Southeast
Immigrant Freedom Initiative. See Artesia Pro Bono Project, AM. IMMIGR. LAW. ASS’N (Oct.
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the NYIFUP model nationwide is being driven in significant part by Vera, in
close collaboration with national organizations and local communities.56
Through its Safety and Fairness for Everyone (SAFE) Cities initiative, Vera
works with a group of geographically and politically diverse jurisdictions and
communities to design, support, and implement universal representation
systems in these areas.57 In a number of sites outside the SAFE Cities
network, community organizations and coalitions have spearheaded work to
develop similar systems.58 Collectively, these efforts have resulted in a
highly local but connected and cooperative patchwork of universal
representation systems.
With this expansion, however, new questions about the contours of
universal representation have arisen. The SAFE Cities initiative explicitly
recognizes that “[l]ocal governments are now the ‘laboratories’ that create
new policies and programs that serve as national models for innovation and
reform.”59 As these local laboratories develop new models for implementing
universal representation systems, municipalities, philanthropists, and
community advocates must consider what exactly universal representation
means, particularly given the reality of limited funding. At bottom, these
questions, which are discussed with more specificity in Part III, arise from
two underlying concerns: (1) economic and institutional concerns about how
to decide whom to represent where funding does not permit full

6, 2014), http://www.aila.org/practice/pro-bono/find-your-opportunity/artesia-pro-bonoproject [https://perma.cc/9K6F-A5Z2]; Services, Family Detention and Reunification,
RAICES, https://www.raicestexas.org/services [https://perma.cc/595Z-AU97] (last visited
Oct. 4, 2018).
56. See SAFE Cities Network, supra note 7. At present, this includes Atlanta, Georgia;
Austin, Texas; Baltimore, Maryland; Chicago, Illinois; Columbus, Ohio; Dane County,
Wisconsin; Denver, Colorado; Oakland and Alameda County, California; Prince George’s
County, Maryland; Sacramento, California; Santa Ana, California; and San Antonio, Texas.
Id. The other national organizations at the helm of this effort include the Center for Popular
Democracy and the National Immigration Law Center. See generally THE CTR. FOR POPULAR
DEMOCRACY, supra note 12; NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., supra note 7.
57. Annie
Chen,
SAFE
Cities
Network,
VERA
INST.
JUST.,
https://www.vera.org/projects/safe-cities-network/overview [https://perma.cc/8SD4-Z2SS]
(last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
58. See Telephone Interview with Victoria Muirhead, Dev. Dir., Innovation LawLab, and
Roberto Gonzalez, Pol’y Dir., Causa (June 12, 2018) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter
Muirhead and Gonzales Interview] (describing work with a coalition of community members
and organizations to create a system in Portland and Multnomah County, Oregon); Telephone
Interview with Annie Chen, Program Dir., Ctr. on Immigration & Justice, Vera Inst. of Justice
(June 8, 2018) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Chen Interview] (describing work in
other areas across the country); see also Susan Abram, LA County Leaders Approve Millions
for Legal Fund for Immigrants Facing Deportation, L.A. DAILY NEWS (June 21, 2017),
https://www.dailynews.com/2017/06/21/la-county-leaders-approve-millions-for-legal-fundfor-immigrants-facing-deportation/ [https://perma.cc/CQ5C-NZ4C]; Jessica Kwong, Santa
Ana Wants to Create Legal Defense Fund for Immigration Detainees Facing Deportation,
ORANGE COUNTY REG. (May 18, 2017, 8:31 AM), https://www.ocregister.com/2017/05/17/
santa-ana-wants-to-create-legal-defense-fund-for-immigration-detainees-facing-deportation/
[https://perma.cc/6SW7-38PD].
59. Chen, supra note 57.
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representation at a particular immigration court, and (2) political concerns
about who should get representation.
The very question of who to exclude from a system described as
“universal” sounds paradoxical, but it is the start of a long line of necessary
decisions that must be made when ideals are confronted with practical
constraints. As such, funding jurisdictions and advocates alike must come
up with some framework for deciding who should be covered and what
minimum coverage criteria is necessary for the system to remain “universal.”
Coverage and eligibility limitations are based not only on funding
limitations, but a range of considerations, from the practical to the political.
Therefore, in creating this framework, it is important to grapple with whether
a system is truly universal if certain practical constraints limit it, for example,
to residents of a funding municipality or to individuals who are detained.60
It is also critical to understand what role, if any, politically minded eligibility
restrictions could play in such a system. As noted above, some supporters of
universal representation systems have sought to introduce a limitation on
their coverage that would deny appointed counsel to those who have been
convicted of certain criminal offenses.61 Collectively, these definitional
questions and debates illustrate the need for a deeper understanding of the
core of the universal representation project and how it can be implemented
in localities with varying practical and political considerations.
II. THE ORIGINS OF UNIVERSAL REPRESENTATION
Litigants across a range of subject matters and fora must defend
themselves against a government attorney without the assistance of counsel.
Legislative choices about which litigants in our legal system should be
entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel are therefore revealing,
particularly when that choice is made absent any constitutional mandate to
provide representation. This Part considers the choices that led to the original
universal representation systems—pioneered in the criminal defense
system—to understand the decisions made through the early twentieth
century, before the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to
counsel and when decisions about defense in the criminal system were
instead governed by questions of resources and justice. While the criminal
context is in some ways distinct from the immigration context, it was the
first, and for centuries only, area that adopted a universal representation
model. For that reason, it useful to understand the history, as it sheds
important light on contemporary questions, including the reasons for
appointed counsel, the place of the appointed counsel system in the broader
60. See Chen Interview, supra note 58 (describing some of the questions that localities
confront in designing such systems). Chen notes that the SAFE Cities Program works with a
range of localities to implement representation programs, but a key component of its
replication efforts is intake that does not allow for merits-based screening. E-mail from Annie
Chen, to author (Sept. 17, 2018, 11:28 AM) (on file with author).
61. See Pazmino, supra note 9; Robbins, supra note 9. A similar restriction has been
proposed in the Los Angeles area’s system. See Abram, supra note 58.
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American justice system, and the role the system should play in removal
defense and other high-stakes prosecutions today.
For a significant portion of English history, the right to even retain counsel
paid for by the litigant was limited. Until the early nineteenth century, the
right to the assistance of (retained) counsel under English law was, for the
most part, restricted to those charged with misdemeanors or minor offenses.62
This was, according to historians, because the state’s interest was deemed to
be slight in such cases, which typically included charges like libel, perjury,
battery, and conspiracy and were punishable by a fine or, at most, brief
imprisonment.63 In contrast, in felony cases like larceny, arson, murder, and
treason,64 the accused had no legal right to appear with retained counsel even
though such charges were punishable with death.65 Historians from that era
have explained that this rule was based on the general view that anyone
indicted by the king was at least partially guilty and that it was more
important to protect the king’s interest than the defendant’s rights.66 Thus,
for much of English history, and certainly for the period fresh in colonial
Americans’ minds, the English system generally represented an
“incongruous practice” wherein even in serious cases with death as the
penalty, “an accused was denied the right to retain counsel, while in cases
involving a fine or, at most, brief imprisonment, the courts afforded him this
right.”67

62. WILLIAM BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 8 (1955). The
statute entitling individuals to retain counsel for felony offenses was not enacted until 1836.
An Act for Enabling Persons Indicted of Felony to Make Their Defence by Counsel or
Attorney 1836, 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114, § 1 (Eng.). The right to court-appointed counsel for
defendants who were indigent and needed counsel for their defense was not enacted until
1903. Poor Prisoners’ Defence Act 1903, 3 Edw. 7, c. 38, § 1 (Eng.).
63. BEANEY, supra note 62, at 8–9.
64. The one exception to this pre-1836 framework was a statutory right enacted in 1695
after cyclical political turmoil made members of Parliament fear that an incoming political
party could charge them with treason and they would be unable to mount their own defense.
Treason Act 1695, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3, § 1 (Eng.); BEANEY, supra note 62, at 9. Accordingly,
to guard against this fear, Parliament enacted legislation that not only permitted individuals
charged with treason or misprision to be represented by counsel but mandated that courts
appoint up to two attorneys for an individual’s defense against those charges. See BEANEY,
supra note 62, at 9.
65. Id. (explaining that “most felonies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were
capital offenses, for which the possible (and likely) punishment was death”).
66. See 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 397
(MacMillan & Co. 1883).
67. BEANEY, supra note 62, at 9; see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *356
(“For upon what face of reason can that assistance be denied to save the life of a man which
yet is allowed him in prosecutions for every petty trespass?”). Beaney notes that this situation
was only tolerable because some courts, on their own initiative, simply permitted attorneys to
perform many of the functions on behalf of the accused even in the absence of any statutory
or rule-based authority. BEANEY, supra note 62, at 9–10. The increasing relaxation of the rule
against the assistance of counsel in felony cases in the mid-eighteenth century was seen as a
consequence of the fact that, by then, offenses were prosecuted primarily by private parties
and “the judge could look upon himself as a disinterested referee between two contestants,
rather than as an essential arm of Crown power.” Id. at 10–11.
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Although early Americans adopted much from English law, their approach
to the right to the assistance of counsel was markedly distinct. Even preRevolution, at least six of the thirteen colonies granted a broader right to
retain counsel than did English law.68 At least four of these states—
Connecticut, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina—enacted a statute
or adopted a judicial practice of appointing counsel in serious (generally
capital) cases.69 Following the Declaration of Independence, states’
commitment to the right to the assistance of counsel in serious cases emerged
even more sharply. Through provisions in state constitutions and statutes, by
1800 all states had adopted, at a minimum, a right-to-retain-counsel
provision that was more favorable than England’s.70 New Hampshire also
began providing assigned counsel for defendants in capital cases, and New
Jersey went even further in authorizing the appointment of counsel by
allowing the assignment of counsel in all indicted cases.71 While practices
varied within and among states, these early enactments evidence a consistent
trend: a greater desire to impose safeguards within the court system, which
historians attribute to courts’ understanding that “an accused who was
undefended was at a serious disadvantage”72 and their “greater distrust in
government.”73 Indeed, Reginald Heber Smith, a forefather of the modern
movement to provide counsel to indigent litigants,74 explicitly connected the
68. South Carolina, Delaware, and Pennsylvania enacted statutes providing for the
appointment of counsel in capital cases. 1 Del. Laws 6 (1797); Act of Aug. 20, 1731, § XLIII,
3 Statutes at Large 1716–52 of S.C. 286; 1718 Pa. Laws 130; see Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455, 467 n.20 (1942) (“Connecticut had no statute although it was the custom of the courts to
assign counsel in all criminal cases.”), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342
(1963). Virginia and Rhode Island generally followed the English rule, but eliminated the
provision affording courts discretion to deny an individual representation by retained counsel.
BEANEY, supra note 62, at 18.
69. See supra note 68.
70. Between 1776 and 1800, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, and Vermont adopted constitutional provisions moving from the English rule to one
granting all defendants the right to retain counsel. GA. CONST. of 1798, art. III, § 8; MD.
CONST., para. 19; MASS. CONST., pt. I, art. 12 (1780); N.H. CONST., pt. I, art. 14 (1784); N.J.
CONST., para. 16 (1776); Vt. CONST., ch. I, art. 10 (1793); see also N.Y. CONST., art. 7, § 7
(1821); R.I. CONST., art. I, § 10. Pennsylvania and Delaware had recognized this right as early
as their 1701 charters. BEANEY, supra note 62, at 16–17. South Carolina enacted such a
provision in 1731. Act of Aug. 20, 1731, § XLIII, 3 Statutes at Large 1716–52 of S.C. 286. In
addition, between 1777 and 1791, North Carolina, Virginia, and New York enacted statutes
granting similar rights. See, e.g., 1 N.C. Sess. Laws 238–39 (1792); Act of 1819, 2 Va. Acts
607. Connecticut long recognized this right as a matter of practice, and ultimately
incorporated it into its constitution in 1818. See Betts, 316 U.S. at 465.
71. In 1795, New Jersey adopted a statute authorizing assigned counsel for all cases of
indictment. BEANEY, supra note 62, at 20. In 1791, New Hampshire enacted a statute
permitting anyone indicted for capital offenses to have counsel appointed. Id. at 21.
72. Id. at 25.
73. Id. at 22.
74. See Felice Batlan, The Birth of Legal Aid: Gender Ideologies, Women, and the Bar
in New York City, 1863–1910, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 931, 970 (2010) (describing Smith’s 1919
book, Justice and the Poor, as “deeply influential” and “the first serious account of the history
of legal aid”); Henry Weinstein, Legal Aid for Poor Survives Cyclical Attempts to Kill It: Law:
Though Now Threatened with Sharp Funding Cut, Program Has Persevered and Flourished
over Last 30 Years, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 30, 1995), http://articles.latimes.com/1995-12-
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failure to provide counsel to criminal defendants to a political act that
recalled the harsh English rule that America had rejected.75
Federal legislation in the framing era illustrates this same set of principles,
first providing a right to retain counsel in any case in federal court, and
subsequently providing a right to appointed counsel for defendants facing
criminal charges with the harshest penalties. Specifically, through the
Crimes Act of 1790, which was passed months before the Sixth Amendment
was ratified, Congress provided a right to retain counsel to anyone indicted
for treason or another capital crime and a right to appointed counsel to anyone
indicted for those offenses who so requested it.76 In so doing, the U.S.
government, like the states discussed above, provided a broader right to
appointed counsel than existed in English law by providing assigned counsel
for capital offenses other than treason.77
As the United States grew, this trend of recognizing the right to assigned
counsel for defendants facing the harshest penalties continued. Well before
the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional mandate, an increasing number
of states enacted laws providing for appointed counsel in not only capital
cases, but also for felony cases. By the time the Supreme Court recognized
the states’ constitutional obligation to provide counsel in felony cases in
Gideon v. Wainwright78 in 1963, approximately forty states had already
opted to do so by statute and an additional five states did so as a matter of
practice.79 Of course, a guarantee of counsel and a mechanism for providing
those attorneys raise very different questions, and state systems of
implementing those rights varied widely in the way counsel was assigned,
whether and how much assigned counsel was paid, and the quality of the

30/news/mn-19292_1_legal-aid [https://perma.cc/P8X9-U32Y] (attributing “the roots of the
current federal program” to Smith’s “groundbreaking” book, “the first comprehensive study
of how the poor interact with the American legal system”).
75. REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 107 (1919) (arguing that a declaration
that someone in a serious criminal case should be left without adequate representation “would
be tantamount to arguing for a return to the harsh English criminal law, as it existed prior to
the American Revolution”); see also ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. ON POVERTY & THE ADMIN. OF FED.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 11
(1963) (referencing the English legal system of the past, which “demonstrated that a system
of justice that provides inadequate opportunities to challenge official decisions is not only
productive of injuries to individuals, but is itself a threat to the state’s security and to the larger
interests of the community”).
76. Crimes Act of 1790, § 29, 1 Stat. 112, 118 (“[E]very person so accused and indicted
for [treason or other capital offenses], shall also be allowed and admitted to make his full
defence by counsel learned in the law; and the court before whom such person shall be tried,
or some judge thereof, shall, and they are hereby authorized and required immediately upon
his request to assign to such person such counsel . . . .”).
77. BEANEY, supra note 62, at 28.
78. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
79. John F. Decker & Thomas J. Lorigan, Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of
Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 103, 104–05 & nn.13, 15–16
(1969). In addition, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted a rule providing for
assigned counsel in noncapital felony cases. MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 3:10 (2018). Some states
provided counsel even for less serious offenses. Decker & Lorigan, supra, at 105.
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representation provided.80 However, while there was variation in the scope
of the right to counsel and the implementation of rights, the states’ preGideon provision of counsel choices were generally similar in several
respects: the strength of the right to counsel was greater where the accused
faced a more serious punishment; the right was not conditioned on the
accused’s claim of actual innocence; and the right did not depend on the
accused’s personal, moral, or social worth.81
The movement for universal representation in the context of criminal
proceedings reached a crescendo in the early to mid-1900s, giving rise to a
vibrant debate in the legal community about why—and when—the assistance
of counsel was important.82 A number of prominent advocates, including
criminal defense attorneys, were of the opinion that a defender’s role should
be to prevent errors.83 On that view, defenders were to operate in
semicooperation with the court and the district attorney on a mission to find
the truth underlying the charges and decline to go to trial for guilty
defendants.84 Some adherents to this view thought that voluntary defender
organizations and ad hoc assigned counsel could play this role.85 Others,
80. See Sara Mayeux, What Gideon Did, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 15, 27–46 (2016)
(comparing the East Coast “charity model of indigent defense,” where novice lawyers were
paid low wages and clients were selected based on “worthiness,” with the West Coast public
defenders, who “enjoyed civil-service protections and salaries”); see also Donald A. Dripps,
Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of Criminal Justice, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 883, 896 (2013) (“While almost all states appointed counsel for indigent
felony defendants [prior to Gideon], the quality of indigent defense was widely seen as
dubious.”).
81. Note that several early philanthropically funded legal defense organizations in Boston,
Philadelphia, and New York, which functioned in some respects like a regional defender
service, initially used a case selection model more like the merits-focused selection today. See
Mayeux, supra note 80, at 37–38. These organizations, however, “never purported to offer a
universal service.” Id. at 38. As legal historian Sara Mayeux details, these “charity-model”
organizations, most notably the one in Boston, initially focused their resources on “worthy”
cases of the “meritorious poor” in the early twentieth century, though they eventually accepted
the cases of individuals facing more serious charges or with more extensive criminal histories.
Id. at 38–41; see also id. at 38 (“The ideal client was young, with no criminal history, accused
of a crime he ‘did not commit,’ and extremely poor—preferably, ‘penniless.’” (quoting a 1941
annual report of the Voluntary Defenders Committee)). As Mayeux explains, this group of
defender services exerted an outsize influence because of its location and relationship to the
national legal elite. See id. at 26, 31. However, in raw numbers, it constituted a clear minority
of the criminal defense providers nationwide. See id. at 30 n.64 (noting that the public defender
model—not the charity model—was used in California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Monroe County in New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, and Tennessee).
82. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Inventing the Public Defender, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1267, 1277 (2006) (“The different visions—individual advocate versus Progressive public
servant—drove much of the debate about defenders during the 1920s, when it was a hot
topic.”).
83. Id.
84. See id. at 1275 (explaining that, in this view, a public defender’s interest was “not
solely that of the client, but of truth and justice” such that “the public defender would not
‘pervert justice by trying to acquit a guilty defendant’” in the way that private counsel might);
Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York City,
15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581, 603–10 (1986).
85. See also Mayeux, supra note 80, at 30–31.
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however, saw this as a role for government-funded counsel: indeed, when a
number of cities opened publicly funded public defender offices in the early
1900s, they were “celebrated not in the language of [individual]
constitutional rights, but rather . . . [as] good-government reform.”86 Still
others adhered to the original vision of the public defender model for indigent
criminal defense and argued that defense attorneys should level the playing
field by advocating vigorously for their clients. They further argued that
defense attorneys were important not only to ensure that critical facts were
put in evidence, but also to protect procedural rights and safeguards, reduce
discrimination, and raise the appearance and actual degree of justice afforded
by the criminal system.87 In the end, this latter vision of assigned counsel’s
role prevailed: the public defender is now viewed as a protector of individual
rights and a check against systemic injustice—at least on a theoretical level—
rather than an arm of the truth-seeking state.88
The nature of the debates naturally changed in significant ways once the
Supreme Court began recognizing the constitutional obligation to provide
counsel to defendants in federal and state courts.89 Questions of
implementation and the content and quality of that right have displaced much

86. Id. at 30; see also Mayer C. Goldman, Public Defenders for the Poor in Criminal
Cases, 26 VA. L. REV. 275, 280 (1940).
87. Babcock, supra note 82, at 1271–72 (describing the original conception of the public
defender as “a powerful, resourceful figure to counter and correct the prosecutor, to balance
the presentation of the evidence, and to make the proceedings orderly and just” who would
“mak[e] no distinction between the factually and presumably innocent”); Mayeux, supra note
80, at 30 n.61 (“In the 1890s, California lawyer Clara Foltz first promoted the idea of a ‘public
defender’ to counter the public prosecutor.”).
88. See Mayeux, supra note 80, at 48 (describing a shift toward a public defender model,
which began even pre-Gideon); see also FEDERAL ADAPTATION OF NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND
DEFENDER ASSOCIATION (NLADA) PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE
REPRESENTATIONS 1.1 (DEF. SERVS. ADVISORY GRP. 2015); PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR
CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION (BLACK LETTER) 1.1(a) (NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF.
ASS’N 2006), http://www.nlada.org/defender-standards/performance-guidelines/black-letter
[https://perma.cc/6C8F-KNXH] (“The paramount obligation of criminal defense counsel is to
provide zealous and quality representation to their clients at all stages of the criminal
process.”); Criminal Defense Practice, BRONX DEFENDERS, https://www.bronxdefenders.org/
our-work/ [https://perma.cc/S37A-ZPKP] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (explaining their
approach as “thoroughly investigating their [clients’] cases, raising novel legal arguments, and
using creative tools of persuasion to succeed at trial”). Of course, there is a wealth of literature
explaining the many factors that have prevented public defenders from playing this role. See,
e.g., Babcock, supra note 82, at 1314 (explaining that the absence of sufficient funding
prevents public defenders from serving as a systematic counter to the prosecutor); infra notes
90–91 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (extending Sixth Amendment
right to counsel to defendants charged with nonpetty criminal offences and facing sentences
of more than six months); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–45 (1963) (extending the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel of defendants in felony criminal cases to the states); Betts
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942) (adopting a special-circumstances standard describing
when appointed counsel is constitutionally required in state cases); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 467 (1938) (holding that indigent defendants facing federal felony charges are
entitled to counsel); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (recognizing the states’
obligation to provide counsel to indigent litigants in capital cases).
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of the discussion about who is entitled to counsel in the first place.90 But,
though the legal landscape has changed, the history of why and how the
nation chose to provide assigned counsel to individuals facing government
prosecution should not be forgotten, as it reveals an important understanding
of the role of counsel and the reasons for guaranteeing access for indigent
litigants. Of course, there is ample documentation of the ways in which the
right to assigned counsel has flagged in practice, most obviously because of
insufficient public funding,91 and the failure to adequately fund the
implementation of this right reflects a somewhat weaker commitment to its
provision. Still, the collective and express divergence from our English legal
roots and the consistency of criteria reflected in statutes across the board
serve as a stark indication of the reasons we have provided assigned counsel
and the role that this component of our legal system plays.92
In sum, our history of first permitting and then providing counsel as a
measure to protect those accused of the offenses that carry the greatest
penalty—regardless of an individual’s claim to innocence or perceived
personal worth—demonstrates that counsel serves not just to guard against
error. In addition to the often critical protection that it provided to individual
rights, it was meant to serve at least two important goals for ensuring the
integrity of the system. First, it was intended to function as a check on the
abuse of executive power where the stakes for individuals were high.93
Second, it was viewed as an important component of a legal system because
90. See generally Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and
Resistance After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150 (2013) (arguing that the promises
of Gideon and its progeny have not been realized due to inadequate funding, failure to require
competency on the part of counsel, and disproportionate, unchecked prosecutorial authority);
David E. Patton, Federal Public Defense in an Age of Inquisition, 122 YALE L.J. 2578 (2013)
(arguing that Gideon and the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 improved the quality and
availability of counsel in the federal courts but those gains to the adversarial process have been
diminished due to sentencing severity, the control of that severity by prosecutors rather than
judges or juries, and the coercive power of pretrial detention).
91. As Mayeux succinctly explains, “in the right-to-counsel context, as in many other
legal contexts, commentators frequently identify a gap between ideals (embodied in doctrine)
and reality (embodied in practice),” and there have been significant shortcomings in
implementation both before and after Gideon. Mayeux, supra note 80, at 20 n.24; see, e.g.,
Carrie Dvorak Brennan, The Public Defender System: A Comparative Assessment, 25 IND.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 237, 242–46 (2015) (noting that insufficient funding for public
defenders has created a situation in which appointed counsel cannot possibly provide
competent representation to all of the clients they represent); Erica Hashimoto, Price of
Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 469 (2007) (explaining that, preGideon, “most jurisdictions had been appointing counsel on an ad hoc basis and lacked
comprehensive systems to provide counsel to indigent defendants”); George Yubas, Statewide
Public Defender Organizations: An Appealing Alternative, 29 STAN. L. REV. 157, 157 n.3
(1976) (reporting that, when Gideon was decided, “only 18 states had legislation authorizing
the establishment of local defender offices” and the remaining local jurisdictions generally
used an appointed counsel system in which the court would “randomly assign” private
attorneys to represent indigent defendants).
92. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 589 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Laws
enacted by the Nation’s legislatures provide the ‘clearest and most reliable objective evidence
of contemporary values.’” (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
93. See generally supra notes 68–81 and accompanying text.
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it builds public trust, including by litigants, in the legitimacy of the court
system.94 These bedrock principles, which have long undergirded our
conception of the reasons for, and role of, assigned counsel, remain important
to comprehend the full value of the immigration-focused universal
representation systems taking shape today.
III. THE FUTURE OF UNIVERSAL REPRESENTATION
IN THE IMMIGRATION CONTEXT
Understanding the history of universal representation and its connection to
principles at the core of the American justice system allows for a more
informed consideration of the emerging questions about the goal and
implementation of universal representation. Armed with this theoretical and
historical context, this Part returns to the question of how to describe the
scope of a universal representation system and explores the specific questions
that have arisen as local variations materialize. In so doing, it considers the
consequences of maintaining a true universal representation system and the
dangers of diluting that system in the immigration context.
A. The Core of Universal Representation
To start, we must revisit the question of what universal representation is:
What are the essential goals and features of such a system? As an initial
matter, it is critical to remember that, although representation provided by
this system undoubtedly serves the person being prosecuted in many
respects, the reason that we provide counsel is not only to benefit the person
being prosecuted. While the assignment of counsel is often thought of—
appropriately—as an individual right, it has served to establish and protect
the integrity of systems used for meting out some of the harshest exercises of
executive power.95 Consistent with that, past entitlements to assigned
counsel have not been conditioned on the merits of a person’s claims,
defenses to the charges levied against them, or the content of their
character.96 Put differently, this protection has not been—and is not—simply
94. Goldman, supra note 86, at 275–76 (noting the public interest in legal aid to combat
inequalities between rich and poor defendants); see also Mayeux, supra note 80, at 31
(“During the Progressive Era, prominent lawyers promoted legal aid as a vehicle for
convincing immigrants that they could vindicate their rights through existing institutions
rather than revolutionary politics.”); id. at 32 (quoting one member of a voluntary defenders
board predicting “that making every defendant ‘feel he has had a fair trial will go a long way
towards reducing crime’”).
95. See supra notes 68–81 and accompanying text. For example, in the immigration
context, attorneys working as part of the immigrant universal representation system in New
York have played a critical role in checking federal prosecutors’ unjustified policy of
extending defendants’ time in detention by refusing to file critical evidence. See, e.g.,
Michalski v. Decker, 279 F. Supp. 3d 487, 491 nn.1–2 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). They have also been
crucial in bringing important questions about the administrative power to indefinitely detain a
noncitizen to light. See, e.g., Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 613–16 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated,
138 S. Ct. 1260 (2018); Sajous v. Decker, No. 18-CV-2447, 2018 WL 2357266, at *1, *8
(S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2018).
96. See supra Part II.
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a mechanism for error correction or giving an advantage to politically popular
individuals.
With this understanding in mind, several minimum qualities for universal
representation in the immigration context come into sharper relief. First and
foremost, the provision of counsel must be merits-blind. That is, just as the
right to assigned counsel in the criminal context does not depend on a
defendant’s claim to innocence or the viability of her defenses, it cannot be
conditioned on the strength of a noncitizen’s defense to removal or claim for
relief. Second, as in the criminal context, the eligibility assessment cannot
be based on judgments about the noncitizen’s personal, moral, or social
worth. And third, given its long and important role in checking particularly
harsh applications of executive power, the way that assigned counsel is
allocated should be proportional to the extent of the power wielded by the
executive and the severity of the penalties that may be imposed. In other
words, just as states chose to provide counsel initially only to defendants in
capital cases, then to those facing felony charges, and ultimately to
defendants facing less serious charges, universal representation in the
immigration context must initially focus on providing counsel to noncitizens
facing the harshest consequences in the immigration system.97
B. The Present and Future of Universal Representation
In the space between these core ideals and the practicalities of
implementation, resources, and politics, many questions remain. If funding
only permits a universal representation program to cover a subset of
noncitizens in removal proceedings, who should be covered? Is the program
still accurately described in the language of universal representation if it is
limited to residents of a funding municipality?98 Can it be called “universal”
if representation is only provided to those in detention or denied to those with
certain criminal convictions?99 Applying the core universal representation
framework to specific design questions like these is important not only when
rationing representation among noncitizens but also for future civil Gideon
initiatives that the NYIFUP and its progeny may inspire.100 This section
briefly examines a few of the most common limitations that have arisen as
localities seek to implement the universal representation model and offers
initial thoughts toward a framework to inform the spectrum of universal
representation supporters moving forward.
The more than fifteen publicly funded universal representation
programs—virtually all up and running—offer a good indication of the types
of universal representation coverage limitations and eligibility restrictions

97. See supra Part II.
98. Chen Interview, supra note 58 (describing some of the questions that localities and
advocates are confronting in designing such systems).
99. Id.
100. While the NYIFUP model may provide a useful model for appointed counsel systems
in other areas of law, the path forward in that respect is beyond the scope of this Essay.
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likely to appear in the future.101 Perhaps the first scope question within the
immigration universal representation movement was whether to provide
assigned counsel only to detained noncitizens or to nondetained populations
facing removal as well.102 Thus far, universal representation programs have
focused almost exclusively on providing representation to noncitizens who
are detained and facing deportation.103 The reasons for this focus are
generally threefold. First, the need is typically greatest among the detained
population, for whom finding affordable counsel is far more difficult and the
inability to access procedural protections as a pro se litigant is more
pronounced.104 Second, the impact of counsel is, in some ways, more
profound, both because the assistance of counsel is often critical to helping a
noncitizen secure release from custody and therefore avoid the harms of
detention and because detained individuals face unique challenges given the
barriers to collecting records and contacting witnesses necessary to establish
defenses and claims for relief.105 And, third, while creating a representation
system for a detained population requires resolving a host of logistical
challenges and a commitment to the additional time required to represent
detained individuals, it is also a somewhat more circumscribed goal: there
are far more nondetained individuals in removal proceedings than detained
101. See, e.g., 2018 Budget Amendment No. 2-R1 (Hennepin Cnty., Minn., proposed 2018)
(on file with author) (allocating funding for such a system); Chen Interview, supra note 58
(discussing the system in Hennepin County, Minnesota); Muirhead and Gonzalez Interview,
supra note 58 (describing allocation of funding for forthcoming universal representation
systems in Portland and Multnomah County, Oregon); SAFE Cities Network, supra note 7
(displaying SAFE Cities jurisdictions); supra note 61 (describing funding for systems in Los
Angeles and Los Angeles County). But see Denver Immigrant Legal Services Fund, DENV.
FOUND.,
https://www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/643/documents/
Fixed%20documents/Denver%20Immigrant%20Legal%20Services%20Fund%20One%20Pa
ger%20ENGLISHclean.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WMJ-DD4W] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018)
(describing the allocation of funding for Denver’s program). While the Denver Foundation’s
funding documentation contains a “viable” claim or defense requirement, making it seemingly
not a true universal representation system, this program in practice uses a merits-blind
selection model. E-mail from Annie Chen, supra note 60. Many of these programs have begun
with small-scale implementation where case acceptance is randomized, such that they can
retain the critical merits-blind intake model while operating on limited funding that does not
cover an entire population.
102. See supra Part I.B (discussing New York Immigrant Representation Study’s
recommendation to focus initial funding on detained litigants facing removal where resource
constraints exist).
103. See Chen Interview, supra note 58; SAFE Cities Network, VERA INST. JUST.,
https://www.vera.org/projects/safe-cities-network/learn-more
[https://perma.cc/58QBRML7] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (noting that the SAFE Cities Network prioritizes immigrants
in removal proceedings who are detained).
104. See ACCESSING JUSTICE II, supra note 2, at 15–17.
105. Id.; Michael Kaufman, Detention, Due Process, and the Right to Counsel in Removal
Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 113, 123 (2008) (explaining the difficulties detained
immigrants have in obtaining evidence to support claims for relief); Peter L. Markowitz,
Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation: Varick Street
Detention Facility, a Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541, 559–60 (2009) (noting
communication barriers, even between detainees and attorneys, such as expensive phone calls
from detention facilities and the Department of Homeland Security’s failure to forward mail
when individuals have been transferred to new facilities).
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individuals, and planning is more difficult for nondetained cases because
they typically take far longer to resolve.106
Limiting coverage to the detained population neither privileges stronger
merits claims nor makes a qualitative assessment of the individual’s
character. On the contrary, detained cases have generally been perceived as
more challenging for a range of reasons.107 Moreover, given that individuals
with criminal convictions are more likely to be detained during the pendency
of their proceedings, the limitation does not reflect a desire to reserve
protection for the most sympathetic members of a community or those who
are politically popular. Thus, while the universal representation movement
may strive for a system that ultimately affords counsel to all indigent
noncitizens facing removal, directing limited resources to the representation
of detained individuals focuses these resources on cases in which government
power is the greatest108 and the consequences are harshest,109 making it
consistent with universal representation ideals.
A second common eligibility limitation is one based on residency.110 That
is, many localities have structured their universal programs to provide pro
bono representation only to noncitizens who can demonstrate residency in
the funding municipality or county.111 The localities that have adopted this
type of restriction generally share two common characteristics: first, they
would like to create a program that covers everyone, including nonresidents,
and, second, absent sufficient funding to do that, they choose to protect their
constituents by ensuring that they have access to lawyers.112 Thus, this
residency restriction is based on policymakers’ desire to protect the
immediate community they serve, and the policymakers are generally willing
to eliminate the restriction upon identifying sufficient funds.

106. Eagly & Shafer, supra note 33, at 63; see also Accessing Justice I, supra note 2, at
365–68 (showing that between October 1, 2005, and July 13, 2010, the number of nondetained
individuals in removal proceedings in New York was 48,801, while the number of detained
individuals in removal proceedings was 7198).
107. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
108. ACCESSING JUSTICE II, supra note 2, at 4 (explaining that, when an individual is
detained, “the choice effectively becomes to concede deportation immediately or to languish
in jail with little hope of finding competent, affordable legal representation”).
109. Deportation is virtually always viewed as one of the harshest penalties in our legal
system, regardless of whether the noncitizen has been detained while proceedings are pending.
But detained noncitizens face the additional harms that flow from being detained, as well as
the corresponding impact on their ability to assist in their own defense in their removal case.
STAVE ET AL., supra note 6, at 23 (describing a retired immigration judge’s recognition that
the challenges of fighting deportation are more profound if the noncitizen is detained); see
also ACCESSING JUSTICE II, supra note 2, at 19 (“[I]mmigration detention is a significant harm
in itself.”).
110. Chen Interview, supra note 58 (noting that many jurisdictions with universal
representation programs have this restriction, but many have made it clear that they intend to
work toward eliminating the residency requirement).
111. While this is true of the majority of universal representation systems discussed in this
Essay, notable exceptions include the programs in Oakland, California, and New York City.
Id.
112. Id.; see also Muirhead and Gonzalez Interview, supra note 58.
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The import of a residency restriction in this context is fairly
straightforward: municipal residency has no bearing on the strength of a
litigant’s claim, does not serve as proxy for an individual’s worth, and has no
effect on the extent of penalties that a litigant faces. Instead, it is a way for
policymakers to provide procedural protections for an entire community
within an area and, for better or worse, aligns with the community-protection
arguments advanced in proposals for such systems.113 As such, while
residency restrictions—at least ones like those implemented thus far—may
make the coverage technically less universal and give rise to significant
policy concerns,114 they do not appear to undermine such programs’ claim to
inclusion as universal representation systems.
A third and final type of limitation—less common, but perhaps most
controversial—is the eligibility restriction that excludes individuals from
coverage based on prior criminal convictions.115 This restriction is typically
aimed at individuals convicted of offenses that the jurisdiction considers to
be recent and serious or violent.116 The justifications offered for this
argument typically fall along two lines: (1) individuals with serious
convictions will be ineligible for relief from deportation because of those
convictions, making it wasteful to fund their defense; and (2) those convicted
of “heinous crimes . . . shouldn’t have access to this type of money and
shouldn’t have access to this representation.”117 The negotiations with
respect to this limitation have generated the most dissension and have opened
fissures among supporters of universal representation and prompting
accusations that such representation perverts the very foundation of the
system.118 Thus far, private or nonprofit donors have supplied the funds for
113. See generally, e.g., MANNING ET AL., supra note 7.
114. For example, the exponential degree to which the presence of counsel increases a
litigant’s ability to meaningfully access rights in court will create a two-tier system of justice,
dividing sharply between residents of a locality that provides counsel and residents of a
locality that does not. The statewide system in New York State offer a useful model for
protecting against these concerns. Other ideas for expanding residency conditions include
requiring some family or employment tie to a particular jurisdiction.
115. See supra notes 9, 61 and accompanying text (describing carveouts and funding
debates in New York City and Los Angeles).
116. New York City’s carveout derives from a provision inserted into provider contracts
that denies funding for cases in which individuals would be excluded from city-funded
protection under New York City Administrative Code sections 9-131 and 14-154, the city’s
laws regarding whether to honor immigration detainers. See Letter from Victoria F. Neilson,
Chair, Comm. of Immigration & Nationality Law, N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n, to Bill de Blasio, Mayor,
N.Y.C. (Jan. 31, 2018) (on file with author).
117. Dakota Smith, A $10-Million Fund Will Help Immigrants Fight Deportations. But
Should It Help Those with Violent Criminal Convictions?, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2017, 3:00
AM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-la-justice-fund-20170417-story.html
[https://perma.cc/9ZD7-6WQ5] (quoting L.A. Councilwoman Nury Martinez at a committee
hearing for the L.A. Justice Fund); see also Pazmino, supra note 9; Editorial, Offering Lawyers
to Immigrants Facing Deportation Is a Worthwhile Way to Spend Public Money, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 17, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-undocumentedimmigrants-deportation-lawyers-20170425-story.html [https://perma.cc/2X5F-M8TX].
118. See Liz Robbins & J. David Goodman, de Blasio and Council Agree, and Disagree,
on Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/nyregion/
de-blasio-and-council-agree-and-disagree-on-immigrants.html
[https://perma.cc/9PTN-
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representation of individuals subject to the carveout from publicly funded
representation, meaning both that individuals have not been excluded thus
far on the basis of past convictions and this restriction continues to generate
significant debate in the universal representation arena.119
The concern about an eligibility carveout based on prior criminal history
should give us significant pause. The first justification—that these
individuals typically have no options for relief—is often inaccurate, as the
restrictions imposed by localities do not map neatly onto the legal criteria for
winning relief or bars to eligibility for relief in immigration court,120 and has
led some to question whether it is a convenient cover for bias, which is the
second justification. More to the point, this argument ignores the role of
counsel and what constitutes “success” in this effort. True, the argument for
universal representation often highlights the successful case outcomes that
result when individuals have counsel, but positive outcomes are a by-product
of a successful system; they are not the only goal of a universal representation
system or the only measure of success.
The second basis—that these individuals are too unpalatable or politically
unpopular to deserve counsel—similarly misunderstands the project. This
group of proponents of the conviction-based carveout has made it clear that
the carveout is fundamentally a decision about who the individual is—
undoubtedly based on social constructs of “criminal aliens” and who the
funding locality wants to protect as part of its community.121 And the fact
that one of these same jurisdictions imposes no such restrictions in, for
example, municipally funded universal eviction defense, stands in contrast to
its decision to deny noncitizens the opportunity to fully litigate their right to
7UDK]; Letter from John S. Kiernan, President, N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n, to Bill de Blasio, Mayor,
N.Y.C. (June 1, 2017) (on file with author); Letter from Victoria Neilson, Chair, Comm. of
Immigration & Nationality Law, N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n, to Bill de Blasio, Mayor, N.Y.C. (June 1,
2018) (on file with author); Letter from Neilson, supra note 116; Letter from NYIFUP
Coalition to Bill de Blasio, Mayor, N.Y.C. (May 9, 2017), http://bds.org/wpcontent/uploads/NYIFUP-Letter-to-Mayor-de-Blasio.pdf [https://perma.cc/C55U-4HN6].
119. Chen Interview, supra note 58; see also Gloria Pazmino, Anonymous Donation Settles
City Hall Dispute over Immigrant Legal Services, POLITICO (July 31, 2017, 5:58 PM),
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/2017/07/31/anonymous-donationsettles-city-hall-dispute-over-immigrant-legal-services-113701
[https://perma.cc/MA5AE9UN]; Liz Robbins, Mayor and City Council Make Deal on Lawyers for Immigrants, N.Y.
TIMES (July 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/31/nyregion/mayor-and-citycouncil-make-deal-on-lawyers-for-immigrants.html [https://perma.cc/E6FL-UKSF].
120. As an obvious example, an alleged noncitizen may in fact be a derivative citizen, a
fact which may require a lawyer to prove, but which is not impacted by an individual’s
convictions. Similarly, the relevant legal analyses applicable in cases of individuals with
criminal convictions mean that offenses that sound problematic for immigration purposes may
not actually make them deportable or prevent them from obtaining relief from deportation.
See, e.g., Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018); Neilson, supra note 116 (“[A]n
individual who has a criminal conviction giving rise to ICE interest may nonetheless be able
to successfully fight against removal by seeking complex forms of immigration relief created
by Congress.”).
121. See Letter from Neilson, supra note 116, at 2 (“The Administration appears to have
reasoned that if New York City is honoring an ICE detainer and delivering an individual into
immigration detention, that individual should not get the benefit of city-funded immigration
defense counsel to fight the attempt at removal.”).
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remain in the community.122 In the end, neither justification suggests that
the eligibility restriction is a practical variation responsive to the hard reality
of limited resources. A focus on moral worthiness and, in a sense, legal
innocence would therefore vitiate the “universal” nature of the representation
system and undermine the system’s claim to strengthening the integrity of
the removal process.
While it is easy to characterize the criminal-conviction-based restriction as
one grounded in either policymakers’ distastes or perceptions about their
constituencies’ political views, it is not particularly productive to leave it at
that, as both are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the project.
Even jurisdictions that have not grappled with the flaws in the criminal
system that lead to unjust convictions must understand that the goal of
universal representation is not to permit the public funder to privilege certain
individuals with the hope that they win but to raise the quality of justice and
protect against abuses of extraordinary state power. As such, the universal
representation project is a means of instantiating the state’s interest in
fairness rather than, as commonly conceived, expeditious processing and
exclusion. And, while public funders must understand this goal of the
project, those working to create such systems must also remember these goals
in advocacy and messaging. Since 2013, the astounding statistics and
sympathetic stories about the impact of counsel for those facing removal have
cleared a path for these systems to proliferate and flourish, but they also may
have helped lead to a situation in which funders conceive of success only in
terms of wins. Going forward, it will be important to emphasize that counsel
is necessary to protect rights and further the fairness—actual and perceived—
of the system, not simply to rack up wins. That is, it will be critical to
continue to frame success as the creation of a system in which protecting
access to courts and rights is, in and of itself, a victory.
CONCLUSION
It is an important moment for the movement to provide universal
representation in the immigration arena, not only because this effort is on the
cusp of widespread expansion, but also because it is, at present, one of the
best ways to interpose checks on current enforcement and harsh substantive
law. But this same momentum and proliferation requires variation and
modifications, which can result in the dilution of certain attributes and,
therefore, effects. As such, there is an important opportunity for supporters
122. See Gloria Pazmino, As Budget Talks Wind Down, de Blasio Still Facing Stiff
Resistance on Immigration Legal Services Plan, POLITICO (June 1, 2017, 11:34 AM),
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/2017/06/01/as-budget-talks-winddown-de-blasio-still-facing-stiff-resistance-on-immigration-legal-services-plan-112424
[https://perma.cc/N8KU-KDER] (quoting a letter from the New York City Council to Mayor
de Blasio: “Such policies are detrimental to the well-being of our communities and create and
compound more injustice on individuals who are already at a disadvantage simply because of
their immigration status.”). As New York City Council Member Carlos Menchaca succinctly
explained: the goal is to “step away from rhetoric that one person is more deserving than
another in representation.” Robbins, supra note 9.
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from across the spectrum to be thoughtful about the fundamental goals of this
effort and the core qualities that systems must have to protect those goals.
This Essay draws upon history to show the important structural role that
defense counsel has provided to individuals facing harsh penalties imposed
by the state and considers how that should inform our understanding of the
immigration universal representation system going forward. Ultimately,
while some limitations on eligibility for publicly funded representation may
not threaten the project’s fundamental goals, others, such as conviction-based
restrictions, jeopardize the core concepts underlying the universal
representation model.

